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Chapter pages in book: (p. 42 - 45)bonds, and the feature that bears most closely upon problems of money
supply and price movements, has to do with the effect of their ultimate
repayment, whether by early redemption or otherwise. Much of the recent
literature on fiscal policy and particularly on deficit financing assumes that
an expansion in government debt to be inflationary and a reduction
to be deflationary. Some writers have gone so far as to conclude that any
substantial reduction in national debt is virtually precluded because of the
deflationary consequences that could be expected to follow. This reasoning
is based on two principal assumptions, first, that repayment of debt held
by the banks would tend toward the destruction of demand deposits and,
secondly, that it would restrict consumer expenditures. In the case of war
savings bonds, which are held chiefly by people in the lower-income brackets,
neither of these assumptions can be accepted as valid. Discharge of these
obligations would entail no destruction of demand deposits, such as would
follow payment of debt held by banks.; and a transfer of funds, such as would
occur if they were paid out of taxation, would largely be to individuals
with a high propensity to consume so that the effect would probably be
expansionist.33 With respect to war savings bonds, then, there is considerably
less danger than has frequently been alleged that a postwar reduction of
government debt would exert a depressive influence. It might, in fact, have
the opposite effect. The spenders-for-recovery and the orthodox budget-
balancers may be able, through the medium of war savings to meet
on common ground.
In this respect war savings bonds closely resemble the assets accumulated
under a system of compulsory savings. One of the principal arguments
advanced in support of compulsory savings is that they would provide a
back-log of potential purchasing power for use in the event of a postwar
decline in business. The same end may be served by war savings bonds.
IN CONCLUSION
The increase in circulating medium that has occurred in recent years raises
questions as to the future of Federal Reserve policy.34 The growth in cir-
culation means that the Reserve System, in pursuing policies designed to
influence the volume of credit, would have to conduct operations on a much
larger scale in order to effect the same relative change in bank credit out-
standing. If in the meantime changes had been introduced in reserve require-
88Becauseof the relatively high propensity to consume of holders of war savings bonds, the
general effect of their redemption is likely to be expansionist under any circumstances. If the
funds for redemption were obtained by new borrowing from banks theeffect would be
especially so.
34Theeffects of the war on the Federal Reserve System will be discussed in detail in a com-
panion study in this series.
42ments or larger excess reserves had become customary, the difference in scale
of operations would not necessarily be proportionate, however, to the growth
that has occurred in circulating medium.
At the same time, recent changes in bank portfolios have impaired the
effectiveness of some of the most familiar instruments of credit, policy. This
is particularly apparent with respect to the possibility of restricting credit
by the sale of securities in the open market. The magnitude of their holdings
of government securities renders banks very sensitive to any decline in
security prices. The possibility that sales by the Federal Reserve might,
under certain conditions, depress the value of government securities (and
thereby weaken confidence in 'banks or even precipitate a panicky unloading
of bonds by banks) may appear 'sufficiently serious to deter the Reserve
Banks from making extended use of open market sales in the future.
The importance of this consideration is heightened by the fact that Federal
Reserve Banks have likewise acquired large amounts of government obliga-
tions. At the end of government obligations constituted 93 percent of
the portfolio of the Reserve Banks. At the end of 1918,onthe other hand,
they represented only 13 percent, while bills discounted or purchased
amounted to 87 percent.35 With assets of the latter type, contraction of credit
can be exerted without the same depressing effect on bond prices that might
accompany the sale of long-term securities in the open market.
The existence of excess reserves during recent years complicated the
problem of credit control by the Federal Reserve. While excess reserves have
not entirely disappeared, the practical problem since the spring of
ha's not been to combat an excess, but to provide additional reserves as
needed to facilitate the Treasury's program of war financing. Despite the
temporary respite thus afforded, it is not to be assumed that the problem
of excess reserves has been permanently solved.
The increased volume of currency in circulation in recent years has been
largely influenced by developments associated with the war effort, such
as the expansion of defense industries, the growth of armed forces, and
restrictions on durable consumer goods. With a return of economic life to
peacetime channels, a reversal of these influences is to be anticipated. Unless
counteracting forces come into play the result would presumably be a
retirement of some of the currency now in circulation. At one time such
a movement of currency would have been offset, in part at least, by the
repayment of member bank indebtedness to the Reserve Bank, but today
such indebtedness is of negligible proportions. Earring a further large ex-
85 The policy of not holding government bonds was concurred in by the Treasury as the follow-
ing statement from the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for (p. ioi) indi-
cates: "The Federal Reserve Banks ...veryproperly abstained from directly investing their
funds in Government war securities."
43pansion in bank credit, therefore, a return flow of currency would have a
tendency to cause a renewed growth of excess reserves.
One way of anticipating this possibility would be for the Federal Reserve
Banks to hold chiefly short-term securities. If currency is paid into the
Reserve Banks, holdings of short-term government obligations can then pre-
sumably be reduced by a corresponding amount, provided, of course, that
the government either is not obliged to make new short-term loans or can
obtain them from sources other than the Federal Reserve Banks. In recent
months the proportion of short maturities in Federal Reserve portfolios has
greatly increased. At the start of April the Federal Reserve Banks
reported no Treasury bills or certificates. At the end of 1942, on the other
hand, bills and certificates constituted 33 percent of total Reserve Bank hold-
ings of government obligations and in the last week of May 1943,56percent.
This shift in the character of Federal Reserve Bank portfolios would appear
to have reduced to some extent the probable amount of future excess re-
serves. The running off of short-term Treasury obligations may help at some
future time to facilitate adjustment to a smaller volume of circulating
medium much as the repayment of member bank borrowing was once ex-
pected to do. It would do so without the same depressive effect upon the
price of government bonds that might attend sales in the open market.
Probably the most important conclusion to be drawn from the analysis
presented in this paper is that the methods of borrowing employed during
the war will influence what the Treasury and the banks will be able to do
in the postwar period. It is highly significant that borrowing by means of
war savings bonds, for example, is non-inflationary while borrowing from
banks tends, by bringing about an expansion of demand deposits, to be infla-
tionary. It is also significant—and by no means as well recognized—that
the repayment of these securities in the postwar period would have quite
different effects. Likewise, the pattern of distribution of the federal debt as
between long and short maturities, will determine what future Treasury
action will prove feasible.
Moreover, the Reserve Bank policies that can be employed at all, or that
can be used with reasonable chance of success, will depend on the policies—
such as open market operations, lending on collateral, or changes in reserve
requirements—that are adopted now. Similarly the policies followed by
bankers today—whether they hold long or short maturities, whether they
lend directly to the government or indirectly by means of collateral loans
to customers, whether or not they lend directly to business—will influence
their freedom to follow particular policies in the later period. The magni-
tude of their holdings of government securities is, in particular, a phenom-
44enon of the greatest significance to both Reserve Banks and commercial
banks.
Fiscal policy is construed much too narrowly if we think of it inde
pendently of the circumstances in which it is expected to operate. Not the
least of these external circumstances is the volume of circulating medium.
At times like the present attention is inevitably directed toward short-run
effects of our financial policies. It is scarcely less important, however, to re-
member that the policies of today are setting the stage for the policies of to-
morrow. This is true in the realm of fiscal policy; it applies also with respect
to central bank policy and to the policies of individual banks. We are helping
to determine today both what must be done at some future time and how
it can be done.
ADDENDUM: Monetary Expansion to June 1943
At the time this paper was completed data on deposits and currency were
not available in final form beyond December 1942.Thepurpose of the pres-
ent note is to indicate the magnitude of the growth of deposits and currency
during the first half of 1943.Thetotal volume of circulating medium. at the
end of June 1943 may be estimated at approximately $8o billion. The increase
of 46 percent during the fiscal year was equal to approximately 75 percent of
the total circulating medium putstandin.g in June 1939.
Asthe following summary shows, the increase in total circulating medium
in the first half of 1943appearsto have been only a little over half as great
as in the preceding six months.
Total Increase Increase Increase
June 30, Fiscal July-Dec.Jan.-June
1943a Year" 1942 1943a
(in billions)
Circulating medium $80.0 $25.5 $16.6 $8.9
Currency 15.7 4.8 3.0 1.8
Demand deposits, adjusted 56.0 14.2 7.0 7.2
Government deposits 8.3 6.5 6.6 —0.1
a Estimated
Adjusted demand deposits increased about the same in each period while the
increase in government deposits was exclusively in the first six months, a
slight decrease occurring in the second six months. This was largely because
government deposits were at a peak in December as a result of the first war
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